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OVERVIEW — The rapid increase in specialty cardiac, surgical, and or-
thopedic hospitals has captured the attention of general hospitals and
policymakers. Although the number of specialty hospitals remains small in
absolute terms, their entry into certain health care markets has fueled argu-
ments about the rules of “fair” competition among health care providers.
To allow the smoke to clear, Congress effectively stalled the growth in new
specialty hospitals by temporarily prohibiting physicians from referring
Medicare or Medicaid patients to specialty hospitals in which they had an
ownership interest. During this 18-month moratorium, which expired June
8, 2005, two mandated studies of specialty hospitals provided information
to help assess their potential effect on health care delivery. This issue brief
discusses the research on specialty hospitals, including their payments un-
der Medicare’s hospital inpatient payment system, the quality and cost of
care they deliver, their effect on general hospitals and on overall health care
delivery, and the regulatory and legal environment in which they have pro-
liferated. It concludes with open issues concerning physician self-referral
and the role of general hospitals in providing a range of health care services.
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Specialty Hospitals: Can
General Hospitals Compete?
Specialty hospitals, which provide a limited set of procedures or services,
have created quite a stir among policymakers and the general hospital com-
munity. The growth of physician-owned specialty hospitals, in particular,
has brought to the fore fundamental, unresolved concerns about the struc-
ture and financing of the American health care system. Any discussion of
specialty hospitals touches on questions about financial incentives and prof-
its in health care delivery; financing public health, uncompensated care,
and other public programs; and the general hospital and its place in the
delivery of care—questions that have been posed for years.
BACKGROUND
Recent growth in specialty hospitals—predominately cardiac, surgical, and
orthopedic hospitals—has rekindled the debate about whether competi-
tion among health care providers spurs innovation and drives down costs
or whether it threatens access to certain services or for certain patients by
fragmenting service delivery.1 Advocates of competition claim that these
“focused factories” can produce their services more efficiently than gen-
eral hospitals, give patients the amenities they want, and provide physi-
cians with more control over medical processes. Specialty hospitals may
address perceived unmet needs in their communities and serve as a wake-
up call to general hospitals that they need to be responsive to both patients
and physicians to remain viable. Opponents claim that specialty hospitals
put general hospitals at financial risk by taking the more profitable cases
and avoiding the underpaid responsibilities often shouldered in broader-
based institutions. In addition, physician ownership of specialty hospitals
raises concerns about physician conflicts of interest. Some argue that finan-
cial incentives to selectively refer more profitable patients or boost utiliza-
tion of services may color clinical decisions.
The number of specialty hospitals billing Medicare that are partly owned
by their referring physicians increased from 67 to 76 between 2003 and
2004.2 Concentrated in a few states, these hospitals are more likely to be
located where there is minimal state regulation of the number of hospital
beds or facilities, no dominant hospital, and a large, single-specialty physi-
cian group practice.3 They comprise three general types of ventures: na-
tional chains that partner with local physicians, joint ventures between a
general hospital and local physicians, and physician groups that go it alone.
Specialty hospitals may have a larger impact on health care in their com-
munities than their small numbers and size may imply because they affect
physician referrals to general hospitals, where physicians practice, and the
delivery of care in neighboring general hospitals.
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Because of concerns about the rapid increase in physician-owned specialty
hospitals, Congress, in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), implemented an 18-month moratorium,
which expired June 8, 2005, that effectively stopped their growth. Whether
the growth will resume at the same rate is unclear, although a recent analy-
sis from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicated that 40
specialty hospitals had requested permission to continue to develop or
expand under the moratorium.4 This is likely the lower boundary on the
number of new specialty hospitals that will open in the next year or two.
General hospital representatives indicated to GAO that the increase in new
specialty hospitals would be rapid, whereas specialty hospital representa-
tives said that the increase would be modest and gradual.
In the MMA, Congress also mandated reports on specialty hospitals from
the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). In March
2005, MedPAC issued its report on specialty hospitals, which examined
the mix of patients and costs among such hospitals and their financial
effect on general hospitals.5 MedPAC recommended modifications to
Medicare’s hospital payment system that would minimize unintended
payment advantages to certain hospitals and extend the moratorium to
allow time to evaluate its payment recommendations and learn more about
specialty hospitals. The May 2005 DHHS report, completed by the Cen-
ters for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), compared the referrals to
and quality of care in specialty hospitals and general hospitals.6 Based on
this report, CMS indicated that it would evaluate revisions to Medicare’s
payment systems, including those recommended by MedPAC, and ex-
amine whether specialty hospitals meet existing definitions of hospitals.7
Even with the release of these two mandated studies, and the GAO re-
search that preceded them,8 important questions about the effects of spe-
cialty hospitals on health care delivery have not been fully addressed.
How would Medicare payment changes affect the growth in specialty
hospitals? What is the quality of care provided in specialty hospitals?
What is the cost of care? Do specialty hospitals disadvantage the general
hospitals in their markets? How do general hospitals respond to compe-
tition from specialty hospitals? Do specialty hospitals generate additional
referrals for services? Do the financial interests of physician-owners af-
fect their clinical decision making? The answers to these questions are
likely to vary across health care markets and may change over time as
health care providers and payers adapt to these new facilities.
MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY
AND SPECIALTY HOSPITALS
To respond to its mandate to examine the mix and costs of patients treated
in specialty hospitals, MedPAC conducted an extensive analysis of
Medicare’s hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) and the
relation between IPPS payments and costs of care in specialty hospitals.
Issue Brief – No.804
July 13, 2005
National Health Policy Forum  |  www.nhpf.org 4
Under the IPPS, Medicare pays hospitals a per case amount that varies
depending on the expected resource use of the patient, as measured by the
patient’s diagnosis-related group (DRG) assignment. One of approximately
500 DRGs is assigned to each Medicare patient on the basis of diagnosis,
secondary diagnoses, procedures, and certain patient characteristics. Each
DRG is associated with a payment amount meant to reflect the average
cost of patients within that group. This case-mix adjustment to Medicare
payments is intended to ensure that hospitals are not financially rewarded
or penalized by their mix of patients. MedPAC’s analysis, however, dem-
onstrated that this adjustment is flawed, such that some hospitals are inad-
vertently advantaged and others are disadvantaged by their patient mix.
MedPAC found that, in comparison to gen-
eral hospitals, specialty hospitals were finan-
cially rewarded due to favorable Medicare
payments for certain types of patients they
were more likely to treat. Payments for some
DRGs are higher, relative to average costs, than payments for other DRGs.
In addition, because the DRG payments reflect the average cost of pa-
tients within the group, patients who are less severely ill are less costly to
treat than other patients in the same DRG. MedPAC found that specialty
hospitals tended to treat patients in the more profitable DRGs or that
they had a higher share of the less severely ill patients within each DRG
than general hospitals, or both. As a result, specialty hospitals were more
profitable than general hospitals based on their mix of patients. Accord-
ing to MedPAC’s analysis, in 2002, if cardiac hospitals had average costs,
they would have been 9 percent more profitable than other average-cost
hospitals. Surgical and orthopedic specialty hospitals also tended to treat
less severely ill patients than general hospitals. According to MedPAC’s
estimates, surgical hospitals would have been 15 percent more profitable
than other average-cost hospitals and orthopedic hospitals would have
been 2 percent more profitable.
Medicare’s payment methods for outpatient services may also be a consid-
eration for specialty hospitals. Some specialty hospitals had been ambula-
tory surgical centers (ASCs) that became licensed as a hospital. This would
allow a facility to be paid for more procedures by Medicare and to treat
patients who may need to remain overnight after surgery. Medicare limits
the surgical procedures it will cover in an ASC, but not in a hospital outpa-
tient department. Therefore, by converting to a hospital, a facility can ex-
pand the services it provides to Medicare patients. Further, the payment
would be based on Medicare’s hospital outpatient prospective payment
system (OPPS) amounts, which are often higher than the ASC rates.9 The
range of patients could be further expanded because of the ability to keep
patients overnight. In this case, Medicare would pay the full DRG rate.
Medicare payment policies may inadvertently advantage specialty hos-
pitals relative to general hospitals and ASCs. MedPAC recommended
modifications to the IPPS to reduce differences in relative profitability
MedPAC found that specialty hospitals were
more profitable than general hospitals based
on their mix of patients.
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across DRGs and narrow the expected cost differences across patients
within the same DRG. CMS is considering these recommendations, as
well as modifications to ASC payments that may minimize disparities in
payment across sites. Changes to the IPPS to reduce the financial advan-
tages or disadvantages associated with patient mix would redistribute
payments among all hospitals. Similarly, changes to ASC payments would
affect relative payments across all outpatient providers.
SPECIALTY HOSPITALS:
HIGHER QUALITY? LOWER COST CARE?
Proponents of competition in health care delivery argue that specialty
hospitals can raise the quality and lower the cost of care. Hospitals that
perform a high number of certain procedures, such as open heart surgery
and coronary bypass, have been shown to have better outcomes than
hospitals that have less experience.10 Therefore specialty hospitals, by al-
lowing physicians and hospital staff to focus their expertise, may deliver
higher quality care. In addition, specialization may offer opportunities to
lower the cost of providing a service. By designing a hospital specifically
for performing particular services or training specialized staff, these fo-
cused factories may be able to reduce the time and resources required for
the services they provide.
The proliferation of new specialty hospitals, however, may
have the opposite effect on the quality and cost of health
care across the entire market. If specialty hospitals admit
patients needing a particular procedure who otherwise
would have gone to neighboring general hospitals, the gen-
eral hospitals may have difficulty achieving the volume critical to main-
tain expertise in performing the procedure. The impact on quality may
be exacerbated because specialty hospitals tend to treat the less complex
patients, leaving a disproportionate share of the more difficult patients
needing that procedure for the general hospitals. With regard to their
effect on cost, specialty hospitals would cause overall health care costs to
go up if they were to generate admissions by admitting patients who
otherwise would not have received that procedure or provide additional
tests for patients before or after admission.
CMS’s study of specialty hospitals concluded that, in general, specialty
hospitals provide good quality of care.11 Complication and mortality
rates were lower in cardiac specialty hospitals than in general hospitals,
even after accounting for the less severely ill patients in specialty hospi-
tals. The study could not reach a conclusion about the quality of care in
surgical and orthopedic hospitals, although the available data indicated
similarly high-quality care. DHHS also found very high patient satis-
faction in all three types of specialty hospitals due to the amenities they
could provide. A worrisome finding, however, was that patients treated
in specialty hospitals were more likely to be readmitted to a hospital than
similar patients who were initially treated in a general hospital.
CMS concluded that, in general,
specialty hospitals provide good
quality of care.
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Other studies of cardiac specialty hospitals indicate that quality is at least
comparable to that in general hospitals. A study of two cardiac procedures
(percutaneous coronary intervention and coronary-artery bypass grafting)
concluded that, for these procedures, the patient outcomes were similar in
specialty and general hospitals.12 Although the risk of death following the
procedure was lower for patients in the specialty hospitals, the specialty
hospitals tended to treat healthier patients. After adjusting for patient dif-
ferences and after accounting for the higher volume of these procedures
performed in specialty hospitals, the risk of death was similar between
specialty and general hospitals. Industry-sponsored studies, however, re-
ported higher quality of care in cardiac specialty hospitals than in general
hospitals. MedCath Corporation, which in partnership with physicians
owns 12 cardiac hospitals, states that its hospitals have lower in-hospital
mortality and a higher percentage of pa-
tients discharged home than comparable
patients at general hospitals.13 It states
that the involvement of its physician-
owners in the governance and operations
of the hospitals contributes positively to
its high quality of care.
With regard to whether specialty hospitals provide lower cost care,
MedPAC found that average Medicare inpatient costs per patient were
higher in specialty hospitals than in general hospitals, although the dif-
ference was not statistically significant. This is particularly notable be-
cause the average length of stay in specialty hospitals was actually shorter
than in neighboring general hospitals for the same type of patient. Spe-
cialty hospital representatives indicated that their higher costs were due
to the start-up capital costs of new facilities and the taxes they pay be-
cause they are for-profit entities. The higher costs of specialty hospitals
compared with general hospitals could also be due to their smaller size,
so that fixed capital costs need to be allocated over fewer admissions,
and their tendency to use more staff and more skilled staff.
SPECIALTY HOSPITALS AND THE LOCAL MARKET
General hospitals take notice when specialty hospitals try to enter their
markets. Many cry foul, claiming unfair competition from the new en-
trants. They assert that physician-owners identify profitable patients for
referral to the specialty hospital, leaving less profitable patients for gen-
eral hospitals, thus reducing the general hospital’s ability to cover its costs.
Some general hospitals have threatened to cancel admitting privileges
for physicians who invest in specialty hospitals, whereas others have tried
to get into the game by developing a focused factory of their own to keep
physicians happy and to retain profitable admissions.14
GAO did not find any difference in financial performance between gen-
eral hospitals competing with specialty hospitals in their markets and
similar hospitals without this competition, despite concerns expressed by
Average Medicare inpatient costs per patient
were higher in specialty hospitals than in gen-
eral hospitals, although the difference was not
statistically significant.
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general hospitals. General hospitals contend that their financial ability to
continue to provide a range of services and care to those without financial
resources may be undermined if specialty hospitals erode their patient care
revenues. General hospitals often use revenues from profitable services to
support unprofitable services, such as burn and neonatal intensive care
units. These cross-subsidies have long been a key feature of health care
delivery in this country. In addition, emergency departments, which are
more typical in a general hospital, may attract a disproportionate share of
uninsured or indigent patients to the hospital, putting further pressure on
its financial position. Indeed, the MedPAC and DHHS analyses indicated
that general hospitals do provide more uncompensated care and treat more
Medicaid patients than specialty hospitals.
Even as specialty hospitals gain a foothold in their markets, they are
dependent on neighboring general hospitals because of the breadth of
services they provide to a range of patients. As stated, specialty hospi-
tals do not treat all of the patients who need the procedures they pro-
vide. The general hospital remains the source of care for more severely
ill patients, patients who may need additional services, or patients fac-
ing an emergency health event.
Representatives of specialty hospitals
claim that some general hospitals that
compete with specialty hospitals have
become more efficient by implementing
innovations, such as improved operating
room scheduling or extended patient
hours, that they would not have incorporated had the specialty hospitals
not entered the market. In some cases, the entry of a specialty hospital may
have provided general hospitals a needed push out of complacency.
MedPAC found that general hospitals responded in various ways to com-
petition from new specialty hospitals: “Some hospitals lowered their ex-
penses by cutting staff; others instituted aggressive pricing strategies to
raise revenue from private payers. Many noted their expansions into areas
they view as profitable, such as imaging, rehabilitation, pain management,
and neurosurgery. Through such efforts, these hospitals were often able to
compensate for the revenue lost to physician-owned specialty hospitals.”15
Even if some of the general hospitals’ responses to competition from spe-
cialty hospitals are aimed at improving efficiency, general hospitals may
not be able to match the efficiency of the focused factories across their
entire range of services. General hospitals offer many products. Thus, most
staff, equipment, and space must be versatile in order to produce mul-
tiple, often unrelated, services. General hospitals may not be able to
achieve the degree of specialization—and efficiency—across all services
that could be achieved with a narrower range of products. In addition,
general hospitals may be expected to operate with excess capacity, for
example, to meet surges in demand during flu season or to respond to a
General hospitals may not be able to achieve
the degree of specialization—and efficiency—
across all services that could be achieved with
a narrower range of products.
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natural disaster or terrorist event. This stand-by capacity adds to the costs
of these facilities, making it harder for them to be competitive.
How a specialty hospital affects health care delivery in a market is likely
to vary and be affected by many factors, including the type of specialty
hospital. Cardiac hospitals, for example, may compete for more of a
general hospital’s core inpatient business but may also accept more of
the market’s uncompensated care burden than other specialty hospi-
tals. This is because they tend to be larger, more reliant on inpatient
procedures, and more likely to have staffed emergency departments than
either surgical or orthopedic hospitals. Surgical or orthopedic hospitals
are more like ASCs because their inpatient capacity tends to be small
and because they are unlikely to have a staffed emergency department.
This means that their presence in a market could shift utilization of out-
patient procedures but would be less likely to affect inpatient services,
uncompensated care burdens, or the distribution of emergency patients.
The pressure that a specialty hospital exerts on a given market will also
depend on its line of business, its capacity, its patient mix, as well as the
stability and capacity of general hospitals in the area.
CHANGES IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
AND HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
One of the major concerns about specialty hospitals is the financial in-
centives for physicians with an ownership interest to selectively refer
their patients to the specialty hospital and to increase utilization through
referrals for care. Physician investors in a specialty hospital share any
profits generated from hospital payments—profits that otherwise would
be retained by the facility. They have incentives, therefore, to make sure
that the specialty hospital is fully utilized and to use information, such
as secondary diagnoses, to ensure that patients who are likely to be less
costly to treat than the average, in particular, are re-
ferred to the specialty hospital. Indeed, all three types
of specialty hospitals had a higher proportion of the
more profitable patients within the case types, as de-
fined by the DRGs.
Specialty hospital representatives contend that their referral patterns sim-
ply represent community practice standards. It is appropriate, they say,
for the less severe patients to be referred to the less intensive treatment
site. Adjustments to the payment system, such as those recommended by
MedPAC, would reduce but not necessarily eliminate the financial re-
wards for selective referrals.
Physicians’ economic interests in a specialty hospital also raise concerns
about utilization, although there is no evidence of physician-induced de-
mand with respect to these hospitals.16 First documented with respect to
ancillary services, such as lab tests or imaging services, research has shown
that physicians with an ownership interest in the laboratory or radiology
Physicians’ economic interests in a spe-
cialty hospital raise concerns about
physician-induced demand.
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equipment referred their patients for more tests than physicians with no
ownership interest. The physician-investor has similar incentives to boost
utilization of the specialty hospital, which could increase overall health
care costs without a corresponding increase in quality of care.
Specialty hospitals provide workplace advantages to physicians as well as
financial benefits. By being more responsive to physicians, specialty hospi-
tals allow physicians to increase their productivity and, therefore, their bill-
ings for professional fees. In fact, interviews conducted by MedPAC and
GAO indicated that many physicians turned to specialty hospitals out of
frustration in trying to influence general hospitals with respect to schedul-
ing, staffing, and other managerial issues. Physicians said they favored sev-
eral characteristics of specialty hospitals, including fewer emergencies to
interrupt their schedules, less down time between surgeries, and greater
control over the delivery of care—all of which would directly affect their
productivity. Some general hospitals may be able to adjust their manage-
ment to better meet the needs of such physicians, but others may not due
to competing demands or philosophies.
LIMITS ON PHYSICIAN SELF-REFERRALS
Concerns about the effects of physicians’ ability to profit from referrals on
health care utilization and quality have prompted measures to control im-
proper referrals. The anti-kickback statute, passed in 1972, is a broad crimi-
nal statute that prohibits remuneration of any sort to a physician for refer-
ring a patient for services paid by a federal health care program.17 Few
cases have been successfully litigated under this statute, however, because
of the burden of proof of intentional violation of the statute and because
the statute is generally enforced on a case-by-case basis. The Ethics in Pa-
tient Referrals Act, or “Stark laws,” enacted in 1989 and expanded in 1993,
prohibits physicians from referring Medicare or Medicaid patients to fa-
cilities in which they have a financial interest.18 One exception allows phy-
sicians to provide and bill for ancillary services, like x-rays and lab tests, in
their own offices. Another, the “whole hospital” exception, applies if the
physician has a financial interest in the entire facility because an individual
physician’s admission practices are not likely to affect the hospital’s profit-
ability. This exception does not apply if the physician’s financial interest is
in a subdivision or part of a hospital. Spe-
cialty hospitals believe they are in compli-
ance with this law because they are licensed
as a hospital. General hospitals assert that
specialty hospitals are more like a subdivi-
sion of a hospital, and therefore, the whole
hospital exception would not apply.
Gainsharing has been proposed as a means to align the financial incen-
tives of hospitals and physicians to improve care while avoiding some
of the issues associated with physician self-referrals. MedPAC and a
recent bipartisan bill on specialty hospitals endorsed gainsharing to
Gainsharing has been proposed to motivate
physicians to work with general hospitals to
realize the same sort of efficiencies expected
from specialty hospitals.
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achieve hospital savings.19 MedPAC recommended that physicians and
hospitals be allowed to share in any financial gain associated with appro-
priate collaborative efforts that were carefully designed to protect quality
of care. The intent is to motivate physicians to work with general hospitals
to realize the same sort of efficiencies expected from specialty hospitals.
This could mitigate some of the frustration expressed by physicians with
general hospitals, which contributed to their interest in specialty hospitals.
Gainsharing arrangements had been stymied by a ruling from the DHHS
Office of Inspector General (OIG) which determined that they violate
current law.20 More recently, however, the OIG has indicated that it will
not impose sanctions in connection with two specific gainsharing arrange-
ments that it reviewed because the arrangements were structured to pro-
tect patients from inappropriate reductions or limits on services.21 The
OIG determined that properly structured arrangements could increase
efficiency and reduce waste.
THE FUTURE OF SPECIALTY AND GENERAL HOSPITALS
Although the moratorium on new specialty hospitals has expired, sev-
eral open issues remain, such as potential refinements to Medicare’s IPPS
and ASC payments, whether gainsharing will be embraced, and the
status of proposed legislation to make the moratorium retroactively per-
manent.22 Regardless of the resolution of these issues, physician self-
referrals for other services may continue to raise concerns about (a) how
these referrals affect health care use and quality of care and (b) how cer-
tain unprofitable services or care for unprofitable patients will be financed.
Health care providers generally benefit from higher utilization, and phy-
sicians are in a unique position to determine that use. Physician owner-
ship of facilities or the means to provide services only intensifies these
incentives. IPPS payment reforms may minimize the incentives to selec-
tively refer to a specialty hospital but will not affect incentives to boost
admissions. This is the case with respect to laboratory services physi-
cians provide in their offices, imaging services, or other tests.23 When the
physician owns the means of production and has control over referrals,
the financial benefits of increased use is heightened.
Specialty hospitals are the most recent provider group to create a niche
by delivering services that had been provided in the general hospital.
This situation has played out before with respect to outpatient surgeries,
ancillary services, and even post-acute care.24 In the case of specialty hos-
pitals, competitors to the traditional general hospital may have improved
service delivery through innovations and efficiencies. However, they may
also have reduced the ability of general hospitals to profit from provid-
ing certain services. As the delivery of discrete services becomes more
efficient, the cross subsidies that often finance unprofitable services or
care to unprofitable patients may become more difficult to sustain.
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